This paper analyzes the daily incidence of violence during the Second Intifada. We compare several alternative statistical models with different dynamic and structural stability characteristics while keeping modelling complexity to a minimum by only maintaining the assumption that the process under consideration is at most a second order discrete Markov process. For the pooled data, the best model is one with asymmetric dynamics, where one Israeli and two Palestinian lags determine the conditional probability of violence. However, when we allow for structural change, the evidence strongly favors the hypothesis of structural instability across political regime sub-periods, within which dynamics are generally weak.
Introduction
The second Intifada, which is the latest episode in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, began on have overwhelmingly been civilian. Figure 1 shows the incidence of violence on both sides over the period September 29, 2000 -May 31, 2007 Concerns that Israel and the Palestinians were becoming involved in a spiraling cycle of violence and retaliation led to a wide international effort to put an end to the bloodshed. Diplomatic efforts included proposals by the Quartet (US, EU, UN, and Russia) and a number of summits and rounds of negotiation in Egypt, Jordan, and elsewhere. The results (the Mitchell Report, Tenet Plan, the Road Map, the Geneva Accord of 2003, etc.) were unanimous in recommending disengagement, either gradual or immediate, as a first step towards peace negotiations. The notion that a cycle of violence exists and feeds on itself motivates the first main goal of this paper, namely to examine the importance of conflict dynamics and whether the data are consistent with persistent and retaliatory ("tit-for-tat") behavior.
The evolution of the Second Intifada and the historical events leading to it, against the backdrop of the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, have been well summarized in Kaufman, Salem, and Verhoeven (2006) and Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2003) , and news summaries of the conflict appear regularly in the media. Against this background, several facts about the Second Intifada can be noted. Importantly, the Second Intifada, unlike the First Intifada of [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] , has been a much more violent and prolonged conflict (the First Intifada claimed the lives of approximately 1,162 Palestinians and 160 Israelis). In addition, during the course of the Second Intifada, both sides experienced changes in policies and political leadership on several occasions. These political sub-periods are given in Table 1 . Because of the length of the conflict and the differences in political regimes, it is less likely that the same dynamic process applies throughout. Indeed, a casual inspection of Figure 1 shows that the incidence of violence during the Second Intifada was not uniformly distributed, with several periods of Sub-Period Description 1. Oct 1, 2000 -Feb 6, 2001 Barak period; Sharon elected Prime Minister 2. Feb 7, 2001 -Feb 28, 2002 Sharon period before extreme violence 3. Mar 1, 2002 -Apr 30, 2002 Extreme violence; operation "Defensive Shield" 4. May 1, 2002 -Jun 30, 2003 Post extreme violence; Palestinian cease-fire 5. Jul 1, 2003 -Nov 11, 2004 Post Palestinian cease-fire; Arafat dies 6. Nov 12, 2004 -Jan 4, 2006 Post Arafat; Sharon's second stroke 7. Jan 5, 2006 -Jul 11, 2006 Olmert, Hamas governments elected; pre-Lebanon War 8. Jul 12, 2006 -Aug 14, 2006 Lebanon War 9. Aug 15, 2006 -Nov 25, 2006 Post-Lebanon War 10. Nov 26, 2006 -May 31,2007 Israeli-Palestinian truce signed by Abbas and Olmert Table 1 : Sub-periods of interest during the Second Intifada. exacerbated violence and relative calm intermingled with each other. These considerations motivate the second main goal of this paper -to formally determine the importance of these particular policy changes on the occurrence of violence during the Second Intifada.
We approach these two main objectives by considering a number of models with different dynamic and structural characteristics. By formally comparing these models, we can get a sense of the relative weights that time series behavior on the one hand, and political change on the other, have in determining the incidence of violence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the statistical model and the framework for model comparison and predictive analysis in this context. Section 3 discusses the data used in the study. Section 4 presents our main results, while Section 5 concludes.
Statistical Framework
The occurrence of violence on day t (t = 1, ..., T ) is captured by two binary indicator variables, I t and P t , where I t = 1 if any Israeli deaths occur on day t (I t = 0 otherwise), and similarly, P t = 1 if any Palestinian deaths occur on day t (P t = 0 otherwise). Therefore, on day t we observe the variable y t = (I t, P t ), which can take one of four possible realizations:
y t = (0, 0) (a peaceful day), y t = (1, 1) (a violent day), y t = (1, 0) and y t = (0, 1) (mixed days). We postulate (at most) a second order Markov structure for y t on each day conditional on the outcomes on (at most) the two preceding days. Given a second order Markov structure for y t , there are 16 possible data configurations of y t−1 and y t−2 for the preceding two days. The second order Markov process structure implies that the outcome y t is related to the conditioning variables (y t−1 , y t−2 ) through the transition matrix θ = θ ij|klmn 16×4 , where the rows correspond to the possible values of (y t−1 , y t−2 ), the columns correspond to the possible outcomes for y t , and the respective entries
give the transition probability of the trajectory ( j, k, l, m, n ∈ {0, 1}. In the preceding, the parameter space Θ consists of non-negative numbers which must sum up to 1 for each row of θ, i.e. since θ ij|klmn are probabilities, they must satisfy 0 ≤ θ ij|klmn ≤ 1 and θ 00|klmn + θ 10|klmn + θ 01|klmn + θ 11|klmn = 1 for each of the trajectories. The Markovian structure is thus a useful conceptualization for our data, which can alternatively be viewed nonparametrically as consisting of three-day strings taking on one of 64 possible configurations.
Upon letting y = (y 1 , ..., y T ) denote all the data, the likelihood function factors as a product of multinomial likelihood contributions
where T ij|klmn denotes the number of days in the sample corresponding to the string (
denote the elements in row klmn of θ and let T klmn = i,j∈{0,1} T ij|klmn be the total number of days in the sample for which (y t−1 = (k, l), y t−2 = (m, n)).
A convenient family of conjugate priors for θ is a product of independent Dirichlet densities, one for each θ klmn :
where the Dirichlet density is given by
of positive quantities satisfy i,j∈{0,1} µ ij|klmn = 1 and τ klmn > 0 is a scalar controlling the tightness of the prior beliefs around µ klmn . Loosely speaking, τ klmn is the sample size of a fictitious sample yielding the sample proportion µ klmn . From the properties of the Dirichlet distribution, we know that the mean of θ klmn is µ klmn and the variances and covariances are
and
In addition, marginal and conditional distributions are also Dirichlet.
Given µ klmn and τ klmn , prior density (2) combines easily with likelihood (1) using Bayes'
Theorem to produce the posterior density
which is also a product of independent Dirichlet densities, where
Because of the prior independence in (5), the posterior analysis breaks into 16 independent analyses, one for each row of θ. The posterior mean in (6) is a convex combination of the prior mean and the sample proportion T ij|klmn /T klmn (the maximum likelihood estimate).
Posterior variances and covariances of θ klmn are similar to (3)- (4) with µ ij|klmn and τ klmn replaced by µ ij|klmn and τ klmn . Additional features of the distributions used here, as well as general discussion of the use of conjugate priors in Bayesian analysis, can be found in standard textbooks such as Zellner (1971) , Poirier (1995) , and Gelman et al. (2003) . Important early work on the estimation of multinomial probabilities in contingency tables includes Good (1965) and Fienberg and Holland (1973) .
Before proceeding, we mention that the model presented above is fairly simple, but nonetheless appropriate for this setting. Similar models have been used in many fields of science including climatology and meteorology (e.g. Harrison and Waylen 2000) , ecology and biology (e.g. Wootton 2001) , and the health sciences (e.g. Sonnenberg and Beck 1993) . We have confined our attention to this structure for two basic reasons. First, the main benefit of this model is that it is very clear. Its parameters are directly interpretable and unambiguous, which is an important consideration when one is trying to uncover basic features of the data in a case study. The second reason is that dynamic simplicity appeared to be favored by the model comparison framework to which we turn attention next.
Model Comparison and Prediction
In the context of the Second Intifada, our objectives are to (i) explore the dynamic characteristics of the process generating the violence and (ii) explore the stability of the process of violence across political sub-periods. These two issues are formally addressed by comparing several alternative models incorporating different dynamic and structural characteristics, through their marginal likelihoods and Bayes factors (Jeffreys 1961, Kass and Raftery 1995) .
In particular, for any two competing models M i and M j , upon using Bayes' theorem, the posterior odds can be written as
where the first fraction on the right hand side is known as the prior odds, and the second is called the Bayes factor. The Bayes factor, in turn, is the ratio of the marginal likelihoods under the two models, where
and where the prior distribution and likelihood function now explicitly involve conditioning on the model indicator M l to underscore the dependence of θ on M l . Importantly, because of the tractability of the posterior distribution in our setting, the marginal likelihoods are available analytically as
The marginal likelihoods obtained in this way can be used to assess the posterior odds in (7), or given a set of models {M 1 , ..., M L } under consideration, one can use the model probabilities p (M i |y) for model averaging in predictive inference.
Two additional issues deserve emphasis in this setting. The first is that when comparing alternative models, the quantities in (7) and (8) sample even for models with simpler dynamics (one lag or no lags) because the models being compared should be fit on the same data. The second issue is that when y is broken up into, say, J periods y = (y 1 , ..., y J ), and within each period we allow for a different set of parameters so that θ = (θ 1 , ..., θ J ), each one independent of the other periods (so that
, the marginal likelihood becomes the product of the sub-period marginal likelihoods
Equivalently, on the log scale ln
Finally, the one-day ahead posterior predictive mass function for y T +1 given y T and y T −1
which is the posterior mean. Hence, appropriate credibility bands for this prediction are given by (3) with µ klmn replaced by µ klmn and τ klmn replaced by τ klmn .
Data
We have compiled an up-to-date data set on the Second Intifada from www.btselem.org, an Israeli human rights organization that is well respected by both sides in the conflict, as well as by international organizations. From the last line of Table 2 To assess temporal dependence, Table 2 are sufficient statistics, in that they are all that is required to construct the likelihood function.
Analysis

Choice of Priors
The posterior independence in (5) is quite useful as it aides interpretability and simplifies the analysis. However, it comes at a price: the need to elicit priors on the rows of θ. In the two-lag Markov model θ has 16 rows, which implies that 16 vectors µ klmn and 16 scalars τ klmn should be determined in order to define the prior distributions. In this paper, we assign common values µ ij|klmn = 0.25 for the hyperparameters across (i, j, k, l, m, n) , implying that transitions are a priori equiprobable and do not favor any of the alternative outcomes. This is an important baseline case that is likely to appeal to a wide readership because of its neutrality on issues such as revenge, preemption, and persistence. To be cautious, however, we check the effect of this specification on our results by conducting a sensitivity analysis over three such priors with τ klmn = 2 (Jeffreys' prior, standard deviations equal to .25), τ klmn = 4 (uniform prior, standard deviations equal to .1936), and τ klmn = 8 (standard deviations equal to .1443). When considering no-lag, one-lag, and asymmetric lag models, the same Dirichlet priors are employed for the rows of θ (the only difference being that θ will have fewer rows, depending on the model).
Stability and Dynamics
The time series analysis here addresses two broad issues: correlation over time and stability over time. The first of these is addressed by introducing lags and the second by allowing for parameter change; both use up degrees of freedom, particularly the second. Permitting structural change to take place now implies that the data y can be split into J periods y = (y 1 , ..., y J ) and in each of these periods the models and parameters can be different. J sub-models-one for each sub-period), this can potentially result in more parsimonious models within the sub-periods. A model with many lags is less likely to favor breaking up the analysis into sub-periods because too many degrees of freedom are lost. Our results are consistent with these broad conclusions.
We take τ klmn = 4 (uniform prior) as our reference point and look at τ klmn = 2 as a loosening and τ klmn = 8 as a tightening. This implicitly corresponds to "halving" or "doubling" the imaginary sample size used to construct the prior. In the following results, the differences between log marginal likelihoods are sufficient to overwhelm any reasonable choices of prior probabilities on the possible specifications. This holds for both model choice and model averaging of predictive results. Tables 3 and 4 contain the posterior results corresponding to τ klmn = 4. To allow for possible structural change, these tables present results for the Second Intifada as a whole, as well as the sub-periods determined by changes in leadership for both Israelis and Palestinians given in Table 1 . As discussed in Section 2.1, to get the marginal likelihood of the structural change model for the entire period, one has to sum the log-marginal likelihoods for the subperiods. The corresponding results for τ klmn = 2 and τ klmn = 8 are consistent with the results in Table 3 and are available upon request. From Table 3 it is seen that the largest log marginal likelihood for the pooled sample corresponds to a specification with asymmetric dynamics. In particular, the preferred model is one where two Palestinian and one Israeli Table 4 : Log marginal likelihoods of alternative models in each sub-period (the log marginal likelihood for the best model in each sub-period is in bold).
lags determine the conditional probability of violence.
However, Table 4 shows that once the analysis considers the potential for heterogeneity among the various political regimes listed in Table 1 , the data overwhelmingly favor more parsimonious specifications within the sub-periods. Indeed, splitting the sample according to the main political events during the course of the Second Intifada is important not only for testing dynamic stability, but also sheds light on the hypothesis that major political changes lead to distinct violence patterns across periods. In the sub-samples, the most preferred specification is the no-lag (simple multinomial) specification, except for the onelag specification for sub-period 6 (Nov 12, 2004 -Jan 4, 2006 ) between Arafat's death and Sharon's second stroke. In particular, summing the log-marginal likelihoods for the best model in each sub-period from Table 4 , one obtains a value of −2476.02 which is much higher than the value of −2575.23 for the best pooled data model in Table 3 (even if one were to restrict attention to simple multinomial models within each sub-period and ignore the first order dependence in sub-period 6, the marginal likelihood of the structural change model would still be −2484.72, again higher than that for the best pooled data model).
Hence, the data strongly favor structural change versus pooling.
We emphasize that in this analysis we do not attempt to relate priors or parameters from one period to the next. This is because each period begins with a significant political event (e.g. change of government) or the initiation of military activity (e.g. "Defensive Shield", the Lebanon War), so that little continuity can be expected. The data and the results in Tables   3 and 4 indeed confirm that these politically distinct periods also translate into dissimilar periods of Intifada violence. Those particular inter-period differences are discussed in the next section.
Posterior Results and Prediction
The posterior means for each sub-period, which are also the one-step ahead predictive mass functions, are given in Table 5 for the τ klmn = 4 prior. The table contains the full set of transition probabilities for the bivariate process for y t = (I t , P t ). The entries indicate that for periods 1, 4, 5, 8, and 9, the outcome y t = (0, 1) has the highest probability, while for periods 7 and 10 the most probable outcome is y t = (0, 0) (in period 2, these two outcomes appear equiprobable). The posterior probability estimates during the time of extreme violence (period 3 between March 1, 2002 and April 30, 2002) indicate that the outcome y t = (1, 1)
is most likely; the severity of that episode is also reflected in the fact that the probability that no one dies on a given day is less than 5%. Table 5 : Posterior means (equivalent to one-step predictive probabilities) for y t = (I t , P t )) corresponding to τ ij|klmn = 4 for the preferred specification in each sub-period. In subperiods 1-5 and 7-10 the best models are static, and in sub-period 6 the best model contains one Israeli and one Palestinian lag, resulting in 4 possible initial states.
For period 6, which is the only period characterized by first-order dynamics, the entries in Table 5 From Table 5 one can also obtain various additional quantities of interest. Two such quantities are the marginal probabilities of violence for each side, Pr (I t = 1|·) and Pr (P t = 1|·), which are obtained by simply summing the columns in the Table where show the substantial variability among sub-periods. The probabilities are constant for periods 1-5 and 7-10, but depend on the outcomes in the preceding day during period 6, which is characterized by one-lag dynamics.
We mention that in a dynamic setting one can use this approach to produce extended (several-day-ahead) forecasts in a straightforward way when such forecasts are of interest, and that the long-run equilibrium forecast is given by the steady-state distribution of the Markov process (as reported above for period 6). An example of such multi-day forecasts is given in Figure 3 , which shows the expected evolution of the probabilities of violence on each side under the four possible starting conditions for the first-order process in period 6. One message from the figure is that it does not take long for the process to converge to its steadystate values. Another message, seen by comparing the effects of violent days (y 0 = (1, 1)) or mixed days (y 0 = (0, 1) or y 0 = (1, 0)) to those of peaceful days (y t = (0, 0)), is that violence on either side raises the prospects of violence for both Israelis and Palestinians in the days that follow.
Conclusion
This paper has analyzed data on the occurrence of violence in the Second Intifada using upto-date data series from the conflict. The modelling framework adopted here requires very little in terms of modelling structure, and hence provides general descriptive characteristics of the dynamics and structural stability of the process. Our results indicate that the data are Table 1 , we find robust evidence of distinct multinomial models over nine of these sub-periods, and a first-order
Markov model for sub-period 6. One implication of this finding is that a fundamental and credible policy change would appear to offer the best prospects for peace, and that the dynamics of retaliation and persistence should not be a major impediment in achieving this goal.
The results of this paper provide ample motivation for further research into the nature of the conflict and its dynamics and stability. One avenue for research would be to use recent advances in the estimation of more sophisticated hierarchical models to attempt to capture the evolution of the probabilities through dynamic latent processes (e.g. Cargnoni et al. 1997 , Sung et al. 2007 or through penalties for changes in the probabilities across periods (Gustafson and Walker 2003) . Yet another avenue for research is to consider additional aspects of the conflict such as data on the intensity of violence, rather than just its occurrence.
